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backed Bush’s plan to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, a move that put labor at odds with vast majorities of
Americans, offended key allies and represented retrograde think-
ing about the future of the American economy. The federation
took refuge in an ambiguous earlier resolution favoring “explo-
ration” with appropriate “environmental safeguards,” which let
each side in the internal debate save some face but really gave
more aid to the drilling proponents. Also, the AFL-CIO followed
the auto workers’ misguided lead in accepting low fuel efficiency
standards. And it has failed to project ambitious agendas with
broad public appeal on other issues as well, such as public fi-
nancing of elections and universal national health insurance. 
There appear to be no rivals for Sweeney’s job. The typical
reaction is, Who would want a position with such big responsi-
bilities and so little power? Despite the frustrations, especially
about organizing, most union activists respect Sweeney’s hard
work in forcing debate on how unions must grow faster and
smarter to wield power for their members. Yet Sweeney is a rela-
tively cautious leader, inclined toward finding consensus, even if
his rhetoric has often raised hopes that he would push for more
radical changes. “When I first ran for office, I said many times it
wasn’t who headed the AFL-CIO that was important,” Sweeney
said recently, “it was where the AFL-CIO is headed.” Indeed,
Sweeney has helped turn the labor movement in the direction of
doing—or at least talking about doing—more aggressive organ-
izing, grassroots political mobilization, alliance-building and
advocacy for all working people. In any case, Sweeney’s mixed
record is far better than the stagnation that preceded him. The test
of coming years will be his ability to focus the AFL-CIO and the
labor movement on organizing, making it both a political priority
and a new civil rights movement, while expanding the social
vision that gives meaning to that mission. ■
‘CHANGING TO ORGANIZE’
n Labor Day 1995, for the first time in decades, the
major media were filled with stories not about broken
strikes and corrupt union leaders but about the promise
and possibility of labor’s revival. John Sweeney, Richard
Trumka and Linda Chavez-Thompson had launched
their campaign for leadership of the AFL-CIO pledging to or-
ganize on a massive scale, “to open up and reinvigorate the labor
movement at every level.” There was talk of building a national
organizing fund, recruiting thousands of new young organizers
and organizing millions of workers in new occupations and
industries. 
In the months following Sweeney’s victory as the new AFL-
CIO president, “changing to organize” became the mantra of a
newly energized labor movement. For the first time, the federation
had an organizing department, a director of organizing and an
organizing fund to support large-scale, multi-union campaigns
in key industries. The AFL-CIO also launched Union Summer,
bringing in hundreds of college students to assist in a wave of
new organizing campaigns. 
These initiatives were not limited to the AFL-CIO. Across the
country, local and national unions engaged in an aggressive effort
to improve significantly their organizing capacity and success.
This entailed shifting staff and financial resources into organiz-
ing, mobilizing leaders and members to support organizing cam-
paigns, and developing and implementing more effective or-
ganizing strategies and tactics. By 1999 the combination of organ-
izing victories and employment expansion in unionized indus-
tries resulted in a net gain of 265,000 union members, the first
such gain in more than twenty years. The great American decline
in union organizing seemed to have finally bottomed out.
But the good news was not to last. This past January, the gov-
ernment released union density figures for 2000 that once again
told a story of decline. For last year was a presidential election
year, and just as in the past, unions shifted enormous resources,
including organizing staff, to the election campaign, leaving fewer
staff and resources for organizing. Overall, organizing activity
was down, and there were none of the massive victories that
had dominated the 1999 organizing cycle. To make matters worse,
in the last weeks of 2000 there was a series of plant closings
and mass layoffs in unionized manufacturing and retail com-
panies, raising the bar even higher if the number of newly or-
ganized workers was to offset those lost to the sudden downturn
in the economy.
Even leaving aside the unusual events of last year, it is clear
that despite all the new initiatives and resources devoted to or-
ganizing and all the talk of “changing to organize,” American
unions are at best standing still. They will need to organize mil-
lions, not hundreds of thousands, of workers each year if they are
to reverse the tide and begin to regain their influence and power
in American society.
Why is this so difficult? Why has it taken so long for new
organizing initiatives to bear significant fruit? After spending
the past fourteen years conducting a series of studies analyz-
ing the factors contributing to union organizing success, I find
the answers to these questions to be painfully obvious. Building
capacity for organizing is one thing. Changing the structure,
culture and strategy of the large, entrenched, democratic institu-
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tions that American unions have become is
quite another.
Transforming the way unions operate
is particularly hard at a time of escalating
crisis and employer opposition. While labor
has finally begun to regroup, the economic,
political and legal climate has only grown
more hostile. Each year, employer anti-union
campaigns increase in intensity and effec-
tiveness. Discharges for union activity, plant-
closing threats, intimidation, harassment and
surveillance have become routine elements
of the organizing process, so much so that
fewer than a third of those attempting to
organize succeed in gaining representation under a collective
bargaining agreement. 
ut it is too easy to blame employer opposition alone.
American unions must shoulder a good portion of the
responsibility for their organizing failures. The problem
is not that the labor movement does not know what it
takes to win. The problem is that the majority of unions
organizing today still run weak, ineffectual campaigns that fail to
build their strength for the long haul. They are not doing every-
thing we know is necessary to succeed in the current climate of
mobile capital, aggressive employer opposition and weak and
poorly enforced labor laws.
There are no silver bullets, no simple formulas that guarantee
union victory. Instead, as my research has shown, union success
depends on using a multifaceted strategy including a broad range
of union-building tactics: committing sufficient and appropriate
staff and financial resources; using strategic research to select
organizing targets and to increase bargaining leverage; emphasiz-
ing grassroots, person-to-person outreach and leadership develop-
ment among the workers being organized; training and utilizing
rank-and-file members as volunteer organizers; focusing on
issues that resonate with the workers being organized and the
broader community; building for the first contract during the or-
ganizing campaign; and engaging in escalating pressure tactics
in the workplace and the community to foster commitment among
the workers being organized and to deter employer opposition.
The more comprehensive, aggressive and multifaceted the union
strategy is during the organizing campaign, the more union-
building strategies used, the more likely the union is to win.
There is no question that in the past five years more unions
have begun to run aggressive campaigns. But for most, the shift
toward a greater emphasis on organizing has been piecemeal.
They have invested some money in organizing, recruited a few
more organizers and added one or two new tactics to their arsenal.
But they have not made the wholesale strategic, structural and
cultural changes required to take on the diffuse, globally connect-
ed and extremely mobile corporate structures that dominate the
American economic landscape today.
Nowhere are these deficiencies more evident than in the realm
of choosing organizing targets. At a time when private-sector
union density has dropped to 9 percent, unions can ill afford to
waste precious time and resources on campaigns and targets that
will not advance their long-term goals. Instead, they need to focus
their energies where they are most likely to
win not just the election but also the first
contract, and on the units that, once won,
will have the greatest impact on strengthen-
ing their bargaining power in existing units.
Unions that attempt to organize any type of
worker in any industry with no regard to
the union’s bargaining leverage in the enter-
prise, community or industry risk seriously
diluting their power, and the power of other
unions, at a time when they most need to
concentrate their power in any way they can. 
This puts a special burden on unions in
core sectors such as manufacturing, where
win rates average as low as 30 percent and where employers are
much more likely to engage in the most aggressive anti-union
tactics such as discharging union supporters and making plant-
closing threats. It is understandable that many industrial unions
look longingly at the hotel and healthcare sectors, where win rates
average as high as 60 percent and plant-closing threats and dis-
charges for union activity are much less common. But as tempt-
ing as those service-sector targets may seem, it would be a grave
mistake for industrial unions to give up on organizing in their pri-
mary industries—and for the AFL-CIO and service-sector affili-
ates to turn their backs on the struggle to organize in manufactur-
ing. Sixty years ago, it was organizing in manufacturing that
helped build the American labor movement and the American
middle class. Today, manufacturing workers have felt the worst
effects of globalization, both in declining job security and in dete-
riorating wages and working conditions. Absent intensive efforts
to organize the nation’s most mobile and global industries, work-
ing conditions will deteriorate even further. If manufacturing is
not organized, there will be nothing to stop the race to the bottom
in wages, benefits and working conditions for all organized and
unorganized workers in all industries.
ven the country’s more successful unions—including
many operating in the service sector—cannot rest on
their laurels. Despite their notable victories, they too
have yet to organize on the scale necessary for labor’s
revival. Ironically, part of the problem may lie in their
haste to expand their ranks. Too many of these unions, along
with the AFL-CIO, have shifted resources into organizing, at the
expense of funding for union education departments and pro-
grams. Thus, at the very time the labor movement most needs
structural and cultural change, it is depleting the funds of the
single most effective force for that change—membership and
leadership education. Increasingly this has meant that the front-
line work of organizing is being done by a flying squadron of
new and inexperienced organizing hires, not by member volun-
teers or rank-and-file leaders within the unit being organized.
Instead of building a union from the bottom up, these blitz cam-
paigns often are little more than flash-in-the pan mobilizations
that fail to build the sense of ownership and commitment among
the rank and file that is necessary to withstand the bosses’ anti-
union onslaught.
In addition, some organizing funds have been squandered on
expensive public-opinion polling in a never-ending quest to deter-
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mine which issues and which words receive the most positive
response from unorganized workers. Not only has this been an
enormous waste of resources that could be better directed toward
actual organizing. It is also based on the false premise that the
most effective efforts merely speak to workers where they are,
rather than using education and action to move them to an under-
standing of what organizing a union is all about. The emphasis
on polling also ignores the transformational process that triggers
most organizing campaigns, when workers discover that there are
some problems that can only be resolved through the independent
collective voice and power that a union can bring.
Meanwhile, only a handful of unions are mounting the kind of
comprehensive external pressure campaigns—targeting parent
companies, investors, suppliers or customers in the United States
and around the globe—that are required to win against the world’s
largest and most powerful multinational employers. And where
these external tactics are being used, they are too often carried out
by staff from the international union or the AFL-CIO, completely
divorced from the rank-and-file organizing campaign. This under-
mines the external pressure campaigns themselves as well as the
rank-and-file ownership and empowerment essential to surviving
daily assaults from anti-union employers.
Exacerbating the situation is the persistent racial and gender
gap separating union leaders and organizers from the workers
being organized. It’s true that significant progress has recently
been made in recruiting more women and people of color as
organizers, but given the demographics of current and future
union membership, the representation of women and people of
color among union organizers, and especially among union lead-
ers, remains woefully low. For more than ten years, the majority
of newly organized workers have been women and people of
color. But too many unions still see these new members simply
as dues payers for the status quo, failing to grasp that they expect
a seat at the table and a voice and power in the union. 
The labor movement has made important gains in its effort
at changing to organize. Unions are running and winning more
campaigns, and winning them in larger units. But they still
have a long way to go before they are organizing on the mas-
sive scale promised by the new leaders of the AFL-CIO six
years ago. It won’t be easy. Not only do unions face ever more
powerful external opposition from employers and government.
There are serious internal obstacles as well—but these, at least,
are within their control. The challenge is to move beyond a
simple tactical effort to increase numbers, and to engage in the
self-reflection and organizational change necessary to reverse
the larger pattern of decline. Only then will labor be able to
build a social movement powerful enough to take on global
capital and win. ■
ADOLPH REED JR. replies
As is her norm, Kate Bronfenbrenner is right on target in her
assessment of the challenges now facing the labor movement.
She presumes that labor’s charge is, or should be, to “build a
social movement powerful enough to take on global capital and
win.” In light of this understanding, the internal limitations that
she describes are mainly expressions of labor’s retreat from
movement-building.
I imagine that Bronfenbrenner would agree that this retreat
stems from several sources, perhaps most immediately the con-
solidation of the service model—often it seems more accurately
described as an insurance company model—of unionism. This
legacy of the postwar capital/labor accord devalues member
education and mobilization, a tendency reinforced by the power-
ful inertia that characterizes unions as organizations that combine
procedurally democratic accountability and centralized gover-
nance. Often it seems that the most incremental changes in union
cultures are as difficult and come as slowly as turning an air-
craft carrier.
In this context, the sea change in AFL-CIO leadership, while
certainly significant, doesn’t get us to where we need to go.
Bronfenbrenner accurately describes the limitations of the fed-
eration’s new commitment to organizing. It has been much more
successful at projecting the imagery of social movement union-
ism—in large measure, instructively, by annexing the symbolism
of women’s and black and brown people’s struggles for civil
rights—than at acting as such a movement. This image con-
sciousness gives the appearance at times that the new model is
all tactics, no strategy.
As I read Bronfenbrenner’s argument, I was struck by an
irony. Through the 1960s and much of the 1970s the orthodoxy
was that organizing outside the industrial sector or trades was
impossibly arduous. Justifications for this view ranged from the
legal restrictions on collective bargaining for public employees
to arguments about the logistical and ideological implications
of the small, dispersed workplaces common in what were under-
stood as service-sector jobs. Lurking beneath those justifica-
tions, it seemed at the time, were assumptions about the limita-
tions, and maybe undesirability, of the kinds of workers who held
those jobs—disproportionately women and nonwhites; “service
sector” often seemed to be a euphemism for those workers. It
is largely the cumulative success in organizing those once widely
treated as almost unorganizable that has intensified the demo-
graphic disparity between leadership and rank and file that Bron-
fenbrenner notes as a current problem.
Much of the relative success in organizing outside the indus-
trial sector in recent years has resulted from factors that Bronfen-
brenner indicates—perhaps chief among them relative immunity
from threats of capital flight. However, another source of that suc-
cess has lain in the extent to which organizing among women and
Hispanic and black workers has been linked, even if only evoca-
tively, to a larger struggle for social justice. Although it is cer-
tainly important for union leadership to look more like union
membership, that goal is necessary but not sufficient for re-
invigorating the labor movement as a broad, working-class-
based social movement. It must also tie itself to a larger social
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THE MAJORITY OF UNIONS ORGAN-
IZING TODAY STILL RUN WEAK,
INEFFECTUAL CAMPAIGNS. 
